嘉宾简介：

Nancy Su，香港理工大学会计与金融学院院长、教授。苏教授研究兴趣广泛，涵盖信息披露、财务报告和审计等话题，在会计、供应链和社会网络等领域建树颇丰。苏教授研究成果丰硕，研究成果发表在Journal of Accounting and Economics、The Accounting Review、Management Science、Journal of Business Ethics等。担任Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics总编辑、China Accounting and Finance Review执行编辑、Accounting Horizons特刊编辑。

讲座简介：

Abstract: This study examines whether the public disclosure of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request logs by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) affects managers’ withholding of bad news. FOIA requests allow individuals and organizations to probe for negative private information before it is publicly disclosed. We find that requests probing for negative information are associated with adverse future outcomes, such as stock price crashes and restatements of financial statements. We then examine the impact of the SEC’s publication of FOIA logs in 2013, which allowed public observation of firms targeted by individuals and entities probing for negative information. Our findings indicate that managers become more likely to release bad news after their firm is targeted by a probing FOIA request, as the public disclosure of these requests increases litigation and reputation risks. Overall, our results provide new insights into how external monitoring and open data policies can influence corporate disclosure practices.