嘉宾简介：

钟远光，华南理工大学工商澳门新葡平台网址8883网站副院长、二级教授，兴华杰出学者， 博士生导师， 中国运筹学会行为运筹学与行为运营管理分会副理事长、 广东省机械工程学会工业工程分会副理事长、 管理科学与工程协会理事等。长期致力于供应链库存优化、 库存共享与分配、 优化理论方法与应用等领域的研究，代表性论文发表在 MS、OR、MSOM、POM 等期刊上。主持国家杰出青年基金项目、国家自科面上项目和青年项目，作为核心成员参与国家自科创新群体项目。 国家重大人才工程入选者 ，获得教育部高等学校科学研究优秀成果三等奖，广东省哲学社会科学优秀成果奖一等奖和二等奖，安徽省科学技术三等奖，OMEGA Best Paper 等奖励。

讲座简介：

The ride-hailing aggregator, an innovative platform in ride-hailing industries, integrates multiple ride-hailing companies, allowing passengers on its platform to choose rides from various ride-hailing companies. Thus, those large ride-hailing companies with customer-side apps may consider joining such ride-hailing aggregators to expand demand. However, if one joins, the large company may directly compete with rivals on the aggregator, like small companies without apps and depending on the allocated demand. Additionally, with her own apps, the large company is concerned about keeping her loyal customers (only riding on her platform) while striving for more disloyal customers (switching between her platform and the aggregator). Therefore, in our work, we first study the impact of the joint on large and small companies, the aggregator, and consumer surpluses and then try to figure out an all-winner solution for all players. We employ a general model framework that captures one large and one small company, one aggregator, and loyal and disloyal customers in the non-joint and joint settings between the large company and the aggregator. Without any external regulation, the large company adopts a price discrimination strategy by setting a low price on her platform but a high price on the aggregator (also verified by real-world data), intensifying price competition and being the only winner in the joint setting. Yet the small company, the aggregator, and consumer surpluses are all hurt. Thus, we propose a fairness-aware pricing regulation by imposing an external fairness level to constrain the price difference for the large company. We find that with a sufficiently stringent fairness regulation, though higher prices of both companies, all participants (including the large and small companies, the aggregator, and even the total consumer surplus) can benefit from the joint due to the ease of market competition and the pooling effect after the joint. Contrary to the conventional view that high prices hurt customers, the total consumer surplus can be improved. Thus, our work provides insights to ride-hailing companies and regulators that customers prioritize fairness and non-discriminatory over low prices. We suggest that the large company cooperates with the aggregator while the small company and the aggregator lobby the regulator to implement a stringent fairness-aware pricing regulation.